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Abstract: 
This article gives some results on the existence of symmetric metaequilibrium solutions for 
metagames in the case of two players with m and n strategies, respectively. We discuss the a-
priori probability of mxn metagames having symmetric metaequilibrium solutions and we give a 
lower bound for this probability. It turns out to be at leastl-e-1 for any scale of two-player 
metagames. For reaching these goals, a metagames algorithm is introduced based on a 
characteristic function and we consider its features. 
o. Introduction 
Metagame Theory (Howard, 1971) as a branch of classical game theory is a very useful 
analysis instrwnent in the decision making field. Compared with classical game theory, it 
is often more practical and easier to use because it considers only the order of preferences 
of the possible outcomes from the point of view of each player. Since concrete payoff 
values are not used, but only their ordinal significance (D.V. Lindley, 1985), it is very 
well fit for complex problems in competitive situations. An impressive example based on 
metagame theory is the conflict analysis methodology of Fraser and Hipel (1984). 
Metagame theory may give representative models for conflict situations in the real world, 
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especially in the case of two conflicting parties. In this article some basic properties of 
such metagames for two players are studied. 
The sigmficant outcomes or solutions in metagames analysis or conflict analysis for all 
players are called symmetric metaequilibria or symmetric metarational outcomes (L.C. 
Thomas, 1984. N.M. Fraser, K.W. Hipel, 1984). Such solutions are called metaequilibria 
in the paper for the purpose of simplification. Similar to classical game theory, a 
metaequilibrium in the case of two players does not always exist. This means that 
possibly for a given conflict problem we can not get stable outcomes for all players and 
the problem would have no solution in that situation, This article considers the existence 
of metaequilibria in the case of two players. We . give several theorems for the existence 
of metaequilibria for metagames in the case of two players with m and n strategies, 
respectively. To prove the theorems, we frrst survey some main ideas to calculate the 
metaequilibria in the case of two players. Furthermore, an important characteristic 
function and its features, such as monotonicity properties are presented. Based on this 
function the theorems are proved. From these theorems we obtain a lower bound for the 
a-priori probability that metaequilibria exist. Taking the limit value for m, n -+ 00 for 
mxn metagames with two players we derive the general lower bound l_e-1, 
1. Metagames: some notatioDS and defmitioDS 
For a given metagame with two players, we denote I as player one, II as the other 
player. Player I has strategy set S with m strategies, player II has strategy set SJ with n 
strategies. According to the assessment of each strategy combination, (i, j) e S xsII , each 
player forms its preference for any given situation. Suppose player I has a set of 
preferences ordered as pi for the outcomes (i, j) e S xSI, so we have 
pI={pl, p2, "', pmn} with p' ~ps, ifr>s; r, s e{l, 2, "', mn}. 
Suppose player II has its preferences ordered as (l : 
(l={qi, I, "', qmn) with q" ~qV, ifu>v; u, vE{I, 2, "', mn}. 
If both player I and player II have no repeated preferences with pZ = pZ+ 1 and t/ = t/+ J 
we have 
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r:f1={l, I, "', qmn} with qU > qV,/or any u>v; u, vE{l, 2, ...• mn}. 
The normal form (L.C. Thomas, 1984) of metagames consists of a double ma~ as 
shown in Table 1. The rows and columns of the matrix are related to strategies that are 
available to the players. The elements in the matrix are the pairs of preferences which are 
the outcomes of the metagame. 
Player II: 
SlJ 
I 
Sll 
2 
SII n 
sl 
I (p,q)tt (P,q)12 (p,q)ln 
Player I: 
SI 
2 (P,q)ll (P,q)22 (p,q)2n (1-1) 
Sl m (p,q)ml (p,q)m2 (p,q)"." 
Table 1 
Based on metagame theory, metarationality of an outcome (symmetric metaequilibria or 
symmetric metarational outcomes) for both players can be determined along the line of 
the Characterisation Theory (Howard. 1971), (L.C.Thomas, 1984): 
For a mxn metagame, let (P, Q)mm be the double matrix of pair preferences for both 
players as introduced above and (Ph, (q)ij the preference for situation (i, j) of each of the 
players. The symmetric metaequilibria set R is the intersection of sets RI• R2, Rj • R4, i.e., 
R=R] nR2 nRj~. The sets R/, R2, Rj • R4 are defined below: 
e1 = min{~(p)i1'~(P)i2,···,m~(P)in} 
I I I 
(1-2) 
e2 = max{m~(q)i1 ,m~n(q);2, .. ·,m~(q);n} 
I I I 
(1-3) 
e3 = max {min(p )lj' m~(p) 2j"", min(p) mj } } J J (1-4) 
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e4 = min{m~(q)lj'm~(q)2j,···,m~(q)mj} 
J J J 
i=l, 2, ... , m; j=l, 2, ... , n. 
Note that the set R, the solution set, can also be given as: 
R=RpnRq 
Rp= {(i,j) I(pJu cEm} 
Rq= {(i,j) /(q)u cEn) 
with 
max(e2, e4J=E", 
max(eJ, e3)=Em • 
(1-5) 
(1-6) 
(1-7) 
(1-8) 
As known, it is possible that there is not any stable outcome ( R = 0 ) for a given 
metagame in some cases. Here we give a simple example to show R = 0: 
Player II: 
Sli 1 SlI 2 SII 3 
Sl [(1,4)" (5,8)12 (6,9)" ] 1 
Player I: SI (4,5)21 (2, 7)22 (7 , 2)23 2 
sJ 
·(9,1)31 (8,3)32 (3,6)33 3 
According to the above metagames algorithm, for this concrete metagame we get: 
En=6,Em=7; 
Rp={(i,j) / (3,1) (3,2) (2,3)}, 14= {(i,j) /(1,2) (1,3) (2,2) (3,3)}. 
Obviously, R=RpnRq= O. 
Let us now investigate under what conditions metaequilibria do exist. 
2. Some Characteristic Functions and Its Properties 
We defme two functions Nand Mfrom (1)--/IoN. Here wis a fmite subset of IR., to which 
we shall refer as a "digital field". For a given wand defmite number Xe IR.we define 
4 
N(X, {O)=f{xEtl1XeX} 
M(X oj = f{XEtl1 x < X} 
Where f is the cardinality of the given set. 
For example: m={1.25, 2, 4.1, 8, 5}, then N(2)=4, N(8)=I; M(2)=1, M(8)=4. 
Several useful properties of N(X oj and /t(X oj are listed herebelow: 
a. strict monotonicity properties: 
Ifx! >r, then 
N(r, oj> N(x!, oj 
/t(x!,oj>/t(r,oj 
If N(Jf, oj> N(x!, oj or /t(x!, oj>/t(X1, oj, then 
x!>r 
b. monotonicity properties: 
If x! ex: , then 
N(r, oj e N(x!, oj 
/t(x!, oj~X1, oj 
If N(X1, oje N(x!, oj or fo(x!, oje /t(r, oj, then 
x! eX1. 
c. complementarity properties 
N(X oj+/t(X oj=f(oj. 
When we combine the characteristic function and its properties with two-player 
metagames, we get some further interesting properties. 
Let us consider a mxn metagame with ej, e1, e3, e4, En. Em as defined before. We have: 
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d. If both players have strictly increasing preferences then one can easily derive from (1-
2) - (1-5) 
n SN(e/, pi) Smn-m+l; m-l SM(el, pi) Smn-n. 
nSN(ej, pi) Smn-m+l; m-l SM(ej, pi) Smn-n. 
m SN(e2, fl) Smn-n+l; n-l SM(e2, if) Smn-m. 
m SN(e4, (f~ Smn-n+l; n-l SM(e4, if) Smn-m. 
If at least one of the players has equivalent preferences for some situations then 
n SN(e], pi) Smn; 0 SM(e/, pi) Smn-n 
n SN(ej, pi) Smn; 0 SM(ej, pI; Smn-n 
m SN(e2, (f~ Smn,' 0 SM(e2, if) Smn-m 
m SN(e4, (f~ Smn; 0 SM(e4, (f~ Smn-m. 
e. If N(En, (f~>lI(Em, pi), or N(Em, pI»II(E", (f~, then the metagame has at least one 
metaequilibrium. 
Because of property b, N(E", (f~ > /t(Em, pi) means N(E", if) > mn-N(Em, pi) or 
N(E", (f~+ N(Em. pI»mn. Hence, there exists at least one situation (s, t) with a pair 
preference (p, q)'rt which satisfies (q)at t? En and (P)at t? Em. In line with (1-6), (1-9), we 
know that situation (s, t) is a metaequilibrium. The line of reasoning is the same in case of 
N(Em, pI»/t(En. (fl). 
f. N(Em, pI)=min{N(e] , pi), N(ej, pi)} 
N(En, (f~=min{N(el' if), N(e4' (f~) 
It is because of(I-8) and property a. 
g. N(Em, pi) 2!n; N(En, (f~ :?!tn. 
If both players' preferences are strictly increasing then 
N(Em, pi) Smn-m+l; N(En, if) Smn-n+l. 
If at least one of the players has equivalent preferences for different situations, then 
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This is due to the properties d and f. 
h. Define (tw as the "digital field" of all entries c (l generated by some row of pair 
preference matrix (1-1) and pcol, pcot C pl, the "digital field" generated by the entries of 
some column, then 
N(En, (tW) ~1 
N(Em, pco~ zl. 
Proof: From (1-3), e2 = max{m~(q)i1,mlin(q)i2'···,~(q)in}' we have for some r 
I I 
e2= m~ (q)j,.. So for column r, N(e2, (lot') =m. This means that for any row we have 
J 
N( e2, mOW) z1. 
From (1-5), e4 =min{m~(q)lj,m~(q)2j,.··,m~(q)mj}' we have for some s 
q J J J 
e4=min (q)sj- Hence for any other row~, there is at least one entry with its q bigger than 
J 
e4. SoN(e4, ~S) =1, N(e4, ~;I8)z1. It leads to N(e4' ~)z1 for every row. 
Considering the above results and the fact, that En=max{e2, e4}, we obtain N{En. (!OW)z1 
for every row. 
With the same procedure it can be proved that the N{Em. pco~zl. 0 
i. From property h, we can easily get another property: 
If 3r such that N(Em, YOW") =n, then the metagame has a metaequilibrium solution; 
or if :is such that N(En , (tis) =m, then the metagame has a metaequilibrium solution. 
3. More on Existence Theorems and a-Priori Probability 
Theorem 1. 
7 
For a mxn metagame, if all entries for one column of the preference matrix correspond 
to the worst preferences {/, i=1, 2, "', m} for player I, the metagame has a 
metaequilibrium solution. 
If all entries of one row of the preference matrix correspond to the worst preferences 
{q, j= 1, 2, "', n} for player II, the meta game has a metaequilibrium solution as well. 
Proof: 
Assume that all entries for a column of preference matrix satisfy the condition of 
Theorem 1 for player I. Obviously, in line with (1-2) and (1-4) e1 is equal to pm and e3 is 
also equal to pm, So we have Em=pm. Then 
I«Em, pl)=1« pm, pl)9n-I, 
According to property g, we have N(En, if) ~ m. So N(En, if) > m-I ~ Il(Em, pl) = 
I«pm, PJ. From property e we know that the metagame has a metaequilibrium solution. 
For a row, if all its entries satisfy the condition of Theorem 1 for player II, then in line 
with (1-3) and (1-5), e] is equal to qn and e4 is also equal to qn. So we have En= qn. Then 
I« qn, (f~=1« q, if) 5h-I. 
According to property g, we have N(Em, ply ~ n. So N(Em, ply > n-I ~ Il(En, (f~ = 
I«qn, aI~. Based on property e we know that the metagame has a metaequilibrium 
solution. a 
Note. that theorem 1 can also be stated as: 
Corollary 1. For a mxn metagame of two players, it is always true that 
Em'?:. pm, En?:. qn. 
If Em=pm, or En= qn, the metagame has a metaequilibrium solution. 
For a meta game without metaequilibrium we must have that Em> pm and En> q. 
Proof: 
According to Eq.(1-2), 
e) =min{max(p)I).mlax(p)I2' ...• m~(p)in}, wehavee1=pr, r~m. Itmeanspr ~pm. 
, . 
According to Eq.(1-4), 
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Since Em=max{eJ, e3}, Wlequal Em2:pm. 
With the same reasoning we can prove En2: qn. a 
Corollary 2. For a mxn meta game with strictly inOl"easing preferences for each player, 
the a-priori probability of the metagame having a metaequilibrium solution, because 
player I's preferences satisfy the condition of theorem 1, is equal to or greater than 
m!(mn-m)!n 
(mn)! 
(3-10) 
The a-priori probability of a meta game having a metaequilibrium solution, because 
player II's preferences satisfy the condition of Theorem 1, is equal to or greater than 
n!(mn-n)!m 
(mn)! 
(3-11) 
Corollary 3. For a mxn metagames of two players with strictly increasing preferences 
satisjing the condition of Theorem 1, the a-priori probabilil"Y, of having a 
metaequilibrium solution is equal to or greater than 
m!(mn-m)!n n!(mn-n)!m m!(mn-m)!n n!(mn-n)!m 
+ (mn)! (mn)! (mn)! (mn)! 
(3-12) 
From theorem 1 we can get an another interesting consequence: if for one player every 
strategy he plays when his opponent plays a certain strategy, will lead to his worst 
preferences, then the metagame must have at least one stable outcome. 
Theorem 2. 
For a mxn metagame of two players, if all entries for one row of the preference matrix 
correspond to the best preferences {i, i= mn-n+ 1, mn-n+ 2, "', mn} for player I, the 
metagame has a metaequilibrium. The metaequilibrium must exist in this row. If all 
entries for one column of preference matrix correspond to the best preferences {e/, j= 
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mn-m+l, mn-m+2, "', mn} for player II, the metagame has a metaequilibrium. The 
metaequilibrium must exist in this column. 
Proof: 
Assume all entries of the s-th row of the preference matrix correspond to the preferences 
{/, i= mn-n+1, mn-n+2, "', mn} for player 1. In line with (1-2) and (1-4), we have 
e}=pmn.n+l, e3=pmn-n+l. So Em=pmn-n+l, N(Em, prows) =n for row s. According to property i, 
the metagame has a metaequilibrium solution. It is obvious that the in s-th row there is at 
least one situation with p:?:Em and q:?:En, which means that in the s-th row there must be a 
metaequilibrium. 
With the same reasoning, we can prove metaequilibrium existence in case all entries for 
one column are the preferences {tI, j=mn-m+ 1, mn-m+ 2, "', mn} for player II. a 
From theorem 2 we can also get another interesting consequence: when one player has 
a defInite strategy to play against any strategy of his opponent, which will lead to his best 
preferences, then the metagame must have at least one stable outcome. 
Corollary 4. For a mxn meta game of two players, it is true that E,n5. pmn.n+ 1, En::;;' qmn-m+ 1. 
Proof: 
Suppose Em > pmn-n+l, we have Emc pmn.n+l+r> pmn-n+l. Because of 
N(Em, pi) S'N(pmn-n+l+r, pi) (according to property b) and N(pmn-n+J+r, pI)=n-r S'n-1, we 
have N(Em, pi) S'n-1. Due to property g, N(Em, pi) Cn. So Em::;;. pmn.n+l. 
Suppose En>qmn-m+J, we have Encqm+l+s> qmn'm+J. Also N(En, (/~ sN(qmn.m+l+s, (/~ 
(according to property b) and N(qmn-m+l+s, (/1)= n-s S'm-1, so N(En, (/~ S'm-J. Due to 
property g, N(En, (/~ Cm. So EnS'qmn.m+J. a 
Analogous to before we have corollary 5 and corollary 6: 
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Coronary S. For a mxn metagame of two players with strictly increasing preferences 
for each player, the a-priori probability of having a metaequilibrium solution because 
player /'s best preferences correspond to one row of the preference matrix is equal to or 
greater than 
n!(mn-n)!m 
(mn)! (3-13) 
The a-priori probability of a metagame having a metaequilibrium solution because 
player I/,s best preferences correspond to one ciJlunm of the preference matrix is equal to 
or greater than 
m!(mn-m)!n 
(mn)! (3-14) 
Coronary 6. For a mxn metagame of two players with strictly increasing preferences 
satisfying theorem 2 for each player, the a-priori probability of having a metaequilibrium 
solution is equal to or greater than 
m!(mn-m)!n n!(mn-n)!m m!(mn-m)!n n!(mn-n)!m 
+ (mn)! (mn)! (mn)! (mn)! (3-15) 
It is easy to conclude the a-priori probability of having a metaequilibrium solution when 
two. players preferences satisfy both Theorem 1 condition and Theorem 2 condition. The 
a-priori probability is equal to or greater than 
Eq.(3-15)+Eq.(3-15)-Eq.(3-15)xEq.(3-15). 
Theorem 3. 
For a mxn metagame of two players, if there exists a situation (s, t) with 
/ .I f mn-n+l mn-n+2 mn} d /,. I f mn-m+l mn-m+2 mn} h h IP/stElP ,p , "', p an l'1IstElq , q , "', q , t e metagame as a 
metaequilibrium solution and the (s, t) must be a metaequilibrium. 
Proof: Because of (P)st ~pmn-n+l, according to corollary 4, it is obvious that 
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With corollary 4, we also have 
(q)st~En-
Obviously from (1-6) and (1-9), we know that (s, t) must be a metaequilibrium. Q 
Tbeorem 4. 
For a mxn meta game of two players with strictly increasing preferences for each players, 
the a-priori probability of having a metaequilibrium solution because the players 
preferences satisfy Theorem 3 is equal to or greater than 
1- (mn-n)!(mn-m)! 
(mn)!(mn-m-n)! 
(3-16) 
The formulas (3-10) to (3-16) can be obtained counting arrangements and 
combinations. Here we take Theorem 3 as example to get formula (3-16). 
We define 
An = r(ttI)= m! 
m n. n • (m-n)! 
For a mxn metagame, the numbers of all cases satisfying Theorem 3 condition are equal 
to the number of all arrangement cases minus the number of cases unsatisfied Theorem 3, 
1.e., 
A"'" A"'" A"'" n mn-n ""'x mn - ""'x A"",_m x A"",-n (3-17) 
The first A: accounts for player r s ordinal preferences; 
The second and the third A: account for player Irs ordinal preferences; 
A:n-m is the number of arrangements of all top preferences for player I such that there is 
no intersection with the top preferences of player II; 
A:=: is the number of all arrangements of non-top preferences for player I in the 
remaining mn-n surplus positions; 
Formula (3-17) is equivalent to 
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(mn)!(mn)!-(mn)! (mn-m)! (mn- n)! 
. (mn-m-n)! 
= (mn)![(mn)! (mn - m)!(mn - n)!] 
(mn-m-n)! 
(3-1S) 
When (3-1S) is divided by A: x A:, the number of all arrangements for two players, 
we get the probability: 
1- (mn-n)!(mn-m)! 
(mn)!(mn - m - n)! 
as mentioned. a 
. 1 (mn - n)!(mn - m)! 
Corollary 7. - ()'( )' is a decreasing sequence in m and n. It has the 
mn. mn-m-n. 
limit value 1_e-1 . 
Corollary 7 shows that for any metagame the a-priori probability of metaequilibrium 
existence is more than 0.632. 
Theorem S. 
For a mxn metagame of two players, if Em =pr, En=if, r+s-2< mn, then the metagame 
has a metaequilibrium solution. 
Proof: 
The proof is simple. 
N(Em, pi) =N(pr, pi) 2 mn-r+ 1 
I/( En, g~= I/( qS, g~ 5s-1 
Because of r+s-2<mn, so N(pr, pi» ~ if, g~ and then N(Em, pi» ~ En, g~. 
In line with property e the metagame has a metaequilibrium solution. a 
According to property e and theorem 5 we have corollary S: 
Corollary 8. If a metagame has a metaequilibrium solution, then the number of 
metaequilibria of the metagame is at least N(Em, pI)+ N(En, g~-mn. 
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In order to investigate the accuracy of the bounds given in the above theorems, we have 
calculated the exact a-priori probability of existing metaequilibrium solution to a 
metagame: 
For 2x2 metagame, the a-priori probability of metaequilibrium existence is more than 
0.926 due to above theorems. We also calculated the accurate result using simulation 
based on original metagames formula. The accurate probability is 0.944. 
For 2x3 or 3x2 metagame, the a-priori probability of existing metaequilibrium solution 
is more than 0.845 based on the above theorems.<The accurate result is 0.941. 
For 3x3 metagame, the a-priori probability of existing metaequilibrium solution is more 
than 0.779 based on the above theorems. If, for a metagame its range is more than 3x3 it 
is tOQ difficult to get accurate result because of huge quantity of calculation. 
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